IMMIGRATION TO SPAIN:  
THE CASE OF MOROCCANS

Ricard Zapata Barrero

Grup de Recerca sobre Immigracio I Innovacio Politica (GRIIP)  
Department de Ciencies Politiques I Socials  
Universitat Pompeu Fabra

July 2006

Report prepared for the Research Project:  
MIGSYS  
Immigrants, policies and migration systems:  
An ethnographic comparative approach

http://www.eliamep.gr/eliamep/content/Folder.aspx?d=11&rd=5565300&f=1368&rf=2036318440&m=-1&rm=0&l=1

The project is funded by the Metropolis Network  
and the Foundation for Population, Migration and Environment

The reproduction of this report is permitted for private and non-commercial use only. The reproduction of this report in print or electronic format is forbidden without prior consent of the authors and the project coordinators
1. Introduction

For years Spain was a country of emigration, mainly to the Northern countries of Europe, but also to Latin American countries in the colonial period. In the last two decades however Spain has transformed into a country of immigration. The accession to the European Community in 1985 and accompanying economic growth and the economic and historical connections with Northern Africa and South America have mainly triggered immigration. Although Spain still represents relatively low numbers of immigrants compared to other European countries (8.5% of the population in 2005)\(^1\), immigration numbers have more than doubled in 5 years. In 2004 Spain received most immigrants of the European Union (EU) (La Vanguardia, 26-10-2005). The large majority of immigrants come from Latin America, Europe and Africa. Moroccan immigrants are the largest foreign national group residing in Spain.\(^2\)

In the beginning of the 21\(^{st}\) century Spain witnessed another important change. While the issue of immigration used to be (and to a large extend still is) mainly a matter of controlling immigration flows (prevention), more recently the social integration of immigration has gained importance. The social integration of immigrants became an issue of public and political debate for the first time in 2000 (R. Zapata-Barrero, 2003c), when riots against Moroccan immigrant workers took place in El Ejido, a market-gardening town (ciudad-cortijo) in Southeast Spain (R. Zapata-Barrero, 2003a and 2003b).

This report describes the main characteristics of Moroccan migration flows and settlement in Spain. We start in chapter 1 with the key events and conflicts related to Moroccan immigration that have shaped the social and political agenda. Chapter 2 gives an overview of the development of Morocco immigration flows and draws on the legal and social-economic characteristics of the Moroccan community. Chapter 3 describes the perceptions towards immigration in general, paying special attention to perceptions of Moroccan population. Finally, chapter 4 describes how the bilateral relations between Spain and Morocco have shaped the current immigration policy. The report ends with some theoretical conclusions on the relationship between Moroccan - Spanish immigration flows and Spanish immigration policy.

1. Political and social agenda: Key events and conflicts

This chapter will shortly highlight the key events related to Moroccan immigration that have dominated the social and political agenda since El Ejido (2000). The first section addresses the Spanish-Moroccan border conflicts related to irregular immigration. The second section is focussed on social conflicts related to the Moroccan community.\(^3\)

1.1. Border control and the question of undocumented people

Although the majority of immigrants originate from Latin America and Europe, for most people immigration refers to the “invasion” of undocumented African immigrants (sin papeles) that are intercepted at the southern border. Coast guards catch every year more than thousand irregular migrants, while a thousand others are drowned in the Strait of Gibraltar (T. Lehtinen, 2005). There is

---

\(^1\) Instituto National de Estadística, Padrón municipal 1-1-2005

\(^2\) According to the Secretaría de Estado de Inmigración y emigración, Ministerio de Trabajo y Asuntos Sociales the number of Moroccan immigrants living in Spain represent 18% of the total foreign population on 31-09-2005.

\(^3\) The main sources for this chapter are the yearbooks of SOS Racismo and newspaper articles from El País, ABC and La Vanguardia, next to academic literature and governmental documents.
no official number, but Amnesty International estimates on some 4,000 deaths in the last 12 years (Asociación Pro Derechos Humanos de Andalucía, 2003).

The European Union Tampere Treaty in this context justified the building of a complex radar system to control the Strait of Gibraltar (the Sistema integrado de vigilancia exterior - SIVE), which started working in 2002 (B. Agrela, 2002; 14). In 2003 started also the operation “Ulises”, patrols to control the maritime coasts of the EU, as a measure to fight illegal immigration (R. Sandell, 2006; L. González-Rodríguez, 2004). As a consequence, embarkations and the capturing of undocumented immigrants are regular news items, increasingly linking immigration to illegality, criminality and human trafficking (see also B. Agrela, 2002; 6). Due to increased border control in the Strait of Gibraltar and expulsions of illegal immigrants by Morocco, more recently a new immigration route has developed between Mauritania and the Canary Islands (P. Muñoz & L. Ayllón, 2006).

In reaction, Spain is following a double strategy. On the one hand, it has send humanitarian help to both the Canary Islands and Mauritania, to secure human rights of the immigrants involved. On the other hand, it has enforce control of its borders, by sending the Mauritanian government patrols to guard their maritime coasts. More important though, they signed an Agreement of Return with Mauritania, giving the Spanish authorities the opportunity to send immigrants back (El País, 17-03-2006). In March 2006 Brussels estimates the amount of people waiting in Mauritania to be shipped to the Canary Island at some 500,000. At the same time some 30,000 immigrants are estimated to be waiting in Morocco and Algeria to storm the fences of Ceuta and Melilla (R.M. de Rituerto, 2006; 18).

The strategic location of these enclaves in the North of Morocco on the crossroad of Africa and Europe has triggered immigration flows from both Magreb countries and Sub-Saharan Africa. A situation that escalated in September and October 2005, when the enclaves witnessed large scale and coordinated attempts of African immigrants to cross the border by forcing their way through the barbed wire fences. To avoid the fate of being send back to their countries of origin within the legal construction of so-called Agreements of Return, many immigrants destroy their identity papers in the hope to be expelled by the police to the Spanish mainland, where they are released and told to leave the country within 15 days (T. Lehtinen, 2005; 11).

These events have lead politicians and media to speak of “attacks on the border” and the “invasion” of immigrants, placing the issue at the forefront of the Spanish and European political agenda. Backed up by the EU, the Spanish authorities have increased police presence in the enclaves, rebuild the damaged fences (and planned the building of a third fence) and renovating the Agreement of Return with Morocco (dated from 1992) in order to not only expel Moroccan nationals, but also other “illegal” immigrants that have used Morocco as transit country (Presidencia del Gobierno, 2005a and 2005b).

Both Spanish and Moroccan governments and the EU have been criticized of human rights violations (Amnesty International, 2005; Human Rights Watch, 13-10-2005; European Council on Refugees and Exiles, 2005). Human Rights organisations have raised their concerns about the violence used against immigrants, the inadequate reception facilities and violations of the right to access asylum procedures. As a result, the political debate has

---

4 According to the Spanish and Moroccan authorities, five immigrants died on 29 September 2006 at the border of Ceuta when some 700 migrants stormed the fence and 6 died on the border of Melilla the 6th of October 2006 when some 400 stormed the fence (EFE, 06-10-2005)

5 In a speech on November 3, 2005, Franco Frattini, the Vice President of the European Commission responsible for Justice, Freedom and Security states: “The tragic events in Ceuta and Melilla have demonstrated that the migration pressure on the EU is increasing. This is a truly European problem that needs a European answer”.

6 The European Commission strategy consists of: 1) the intensification of border control 2) cooperation with Algeria and 3) the development of a comprehensive migration policy for the main countries of origin and transit in sub-Saharan Africa (European Commission, 2005a).
focussed on how to manage immigration flows and reconcile the legitimate control of the borders within the legal framework of international human rights.

It is not to be expected that border control will stop immigration to Spain. The share of African immigrants is increasing and will be one of the main sources of potential immigration in the future (for more information see also R. Sandell, 2006). It should be noted that although the media is mainly focused on the “dramatic” arrival of immigrants at the southern border, the map below (presented by the newspaper *La Vanguardia*) suggests that a far larger number of undocumented immigrants are intercepted at the Northern border of Catalonia. González Rodríguez (2004; 7) in this context argues that airplanes are the most common way to enter the EU “illegal”, by making use of tourist visa.

![Map of Immigration](source: www.lavanguardia.es)

The fight against “illegal” immigration has not only been an issue on the Spanish agenda, but was also an important issue of debate on international summits. Special mention in this context should be made of the Spanish presidency of the EU, where the fight against “illegal” immigration was made one of the main topics on the European Council meeting in Seville (June 2002). Spain proposed to deport illegal immigrants with war airplanes and ships, thereby highly criminalizing the issue of immigration. But also the EU has stressed the importance of the fight against illegal immigration at for example the informal meeting of heads of state in Hampton Court, London, taking place just after the tragedies at Ceuta and Melilla (European Commission, 2005b) and at the last EU top in Brussels in March 2006 that took place at the time of the tragedies at the Canary Islands.

---

7 Examples are the last meeting between Spain and Morocco on 29-08-2005, EU Council meetings of Head of States (the last one in Brussels March 2006), the Euro-African Summit in April 2000, the 5+5 conference of social ministers on migration (Paris, November 9 and 10, 2005), the meetings of the ten countries composing the Euro Mediterranean Partnership (the last one in Barcelona, November 2005) and the African Union–EU Troika in December 2005.
1.2 Social conflicts related to the Moroccan community

Next to irregular immigration, there are also conflicts once immigrants have settled. This section will focus on two major social conflicts related to the social integration of Moroccan immigrants. The first are related to contested demands for a religious infrastructure and the second addresses the violation of basic social rights encountered in daily life, as a consequence of racist and xenophobic sentiments within Spanish society.

1.2.1 Religious infrastructure demands

Although since 1992 religious pluralism is guaranteed by the law (Law 26/1992), the Muslim community lacks the infrastructure that would lead to a normal religious life. The religious demands have resulted in different conflictive situations between Muslims and Spanish citizens, public administration and the private sector. The main demands being: mosques, cemeteries, the availability of halal in public centres, Islamic education in schools and financial services that respect the Islamic law (the Sharia) (B. Tatary Bakry, 2005).

The building of mosques is probably the most important religious demand. It can be seen as an important indicator of the settlement/consolidation of Muslim immigrants. (J. Moreras, 2004, 413). However, the protests of neighbours and resistance of local governments show a major lack of social integration and source of social conflict. In 2002 for example, there were huge protests against the building of a Mosque in Premia del Mar, a small town north of Barcelona (Catalonia) (SOS Racismo, 2002, 239-240; 2003, 214-219). The town became the centre of confrontations between immigrants and local citizens because of the wish of the Muslim community to build a mosque in the centre of the town. The neighbours first collected 5,554 signatures to protest against this plan (ABC, 27-11-2001), but later there were held protests from both proponents and antagonists, including extreme right wing groups. An agreement was eventually signed to build the mosque in a less centrally located site (M. Pérez, 2002 and J. Vives, 2002).

Other examples of towns where citizens refused to permit the construction of mosques followed, such as Lleida, Vendrell, Cervera and Badalona (all located in Catalonia). SOS Racismo comments that these events indicate a growing fear of Islam in Catalonia. In Catalonia the number of Islamic oratories (private chapels) have increased rapidly between 1996-2001. Spain locates some 350 to 500 oratories, of which 136 in Barcelona (J. Moreras, 2004; 413). From 2001 onwards the increase was slowed down as a consequence of protests. What is striking in this context is that Barcelona, unlike Madrid, still does not have a principal mosque. Most religious practices therefore take place in garages or small commercial centres (G. Martin-Muñoz, 2003; 119).

Similar problems resulting in struggles with the public authorities are the demands of Muslim cemeteries or spaces to allow funeral rites, the demand for halal (meat that has been sacrificed according to Islamic rites) in public buildings, the wearing of headscarf’s at schools and the lack of Islamic education. Focussing on the latter, the agreement between the state and the Comisión Islámica de España in 1992 officially guaranteed the right of Islamic education to Muslim students in both public and private schools. In practice however many schools do not provide this opportunity and local governments do not give priority to Islamic education either (SOS Racismo, 2003; 193). In this conflict on religious education two positions can be distinguished. Those who defend extreme secularism, and those in favour of laicism, respecting other religions and cultures (N. Andújar, 2005).

A related issue pointing at the non-neutral state in terms of religion is the lack of finance from the State to other religions than Catholicism. As a consequence, Muslims, Protestants and Jews have started to claim the same advantages as the Catholic Church (that

---

9 An Islamic oratory can be distinguished from a mosque because of the latter’s custom to call Muslims for prayers (called adhan).
10 See also the interview with Dr. Yahia García Olmedo in Revista Verde Islam, 1995
receives money from the state) and pressed the Government for privileges comparable to those enjoyed by the Catholic Church. These demands have resulted in broadening the scope of expenditures from Christian to Social funds, including next to Christians also Muslims, Jews and Evangelists (J. Bastante, 2004b; 32).

An example of religious demands from the Muslim community related to the private sector has to do with banks. Although the Muslim population consists of some 800,000 to 1,500,000 people, banks have not yet provided services that are consistent with the Islamic law (the Sharia), in which both paying and receiving interests are conceived as a sin. The director of the Instituto Halal argues there is an increasing demand for financial services that respect the Sharia. Banks in other European countries have already adapted their services to demands of the Muslim population. (M. Rius, 2006; 13).

Finally it should be mentioned that the Islam is currently often presented as the most opposed civilisation in the Western world. The terrorist attacks in Madrid 2004 have mainly resulted in the wish to control the Muslim community and to avoid the presence of extreme imams, as mosques are feared to be centres of terrorism. According to a speech by the minister of Interior, José Antonio Alonso: “we have to control the Friday sermons, because it is here were attacks like 11 are collaborated”. [...] (I. Ramos Rioja, 2004a). In order to prevent the radicalisation of Muslims, the government has proposed to control the financial flows, as it is the case with the Catholic Church (E. Giralt, 2004; 39). Although Spain has one of the most advanced agreements with the Islamic Commission on this issue (La Comisión Islámica de España) it is not put practice (I. Ramos Rioja, 2004b; 34), as the government lacks a register for imams and mosques to control Islamism.

Next to finance, a major problem is perceived to be the lack of control over imams that unlike Arab countries do not have to fulfil requirements to practice their profession in Spanish Mosques. ATIME, the main Moroccan immigrant workers organisation has proposed to construct a democratic Muslim council for each autonomous community that is responsible for the supervision of Mosques and appointment of Imams, in order to stop the radicalisation of the Islam financed by Saudi Arabia (E. Granda and T. Bárbulo, 2004; 21 and T. Bárbulo, 2004; 14). The main Muslim organisations have also asked the Socialist government to end religious discrimination and open faculties for Islamic theology to teach future imams (like with the Catholic church, which is also financed by the government). The lack of possibilities to study Islamic theology results in Imams coming from abroad, they argue (J. Bastante, 2004a; 15).

1.2.2 Living conditions: Racism & Xenophobia as the norm

In terms of living conditions (work, housing, education) the Moroccan community is one of the poorest and marginalized segments of the foreign population. Racism and xenophobia are the most important causes of this situation. First of all, it is considerable more difficult to find a job, when being a Magrebi (often called moor), because of discrimination on the labour market. Secondly the immigration laws have made it almost impossible for irregular residents to apply for a work permit. A consequence is the exploitation of workers without papers. This

11 La Federación Española de Entidades Religiosas Islámicas (Feeri) is one of the organisations of the Islamic Commission that has signed this Cooperation Agreement with Spain in 1992. They proposed a double aim: to avoid the external finance of imams and cult places (like the Centro Islámico de Madrid) and a so-called “garage Islam”, as a result of xenophobic and racist reactions to the building of mosques (La Vanguardia, 25-01-2006)

12 The issues discussed in this section have been structural themes in the yearbooks that the federation SOS Racismo published yearly between 2001 and 2004 (and before) on Racism in the Spanish State.
situation leads to considerably lower payments and a lack of safety standards, labour security and worker rights.\textsuperscript{13}

A recently published study on immigration and housing highlights that more than 60\% of the immigrants share their room and some 19\% live in rooms less than 10 m\textsuperscript{2} (C. Pereda, 2004; 112-114). Another shocking result is the practice of so-called “warm beds” (\textit{camas calientes}), referring to some 12,000 persons only renting a bed to sleep, whereby rooms are rented to more people at the same time (C. Pereda, 2004; 201). Also racist texts, like “not for immigrants” on websites of housing agencies are reported. In sum, the housing sector is knows a lot of xenophobic practices. High prices and lack of papers do not improve this situation. As Magrebi’s can hardly find housing on the formal market because of discrimination and lack of economic strength, an informal housing circuit has developed where rooms in bad conditions are rented for high prices.\textsuperscript{14}

Finally, another topic is education. \textit{SOS Racismo} reports about the lack of immigrant youngsters obtaining education and the segregation of immigrant students in public schools (there are almost no immigrant students inscribed in private schools), resulting sometimes to scholarly ghettos. There are also reports of racist admission practices.\textsuperscript{15} In 2003 for example, a school in Tarragona did not accept children from foreigners (O. Aymila, 2003). Education finally is also a basic instrument for creating and transmitting a certain image of the Moroccan “cultural other” in the eyes of the Spaniards, mostly by teaching history about the Muslim invasion and the following fight against the Muslim invaders.

2. The Moroccan community

2.1 Demographic development

Immigrants with a residence permit currently make up 6.2\% of the Spanish population, compared to 1.2\% in 1995.\textsuperscript{16} The annual increase of the foreign population was only 2.2\% on average from 1975 to 1985 and was outweighed by emigration. From 1985 to 1991 the foreign population started to grow more rapidly, with 7\% annually, thereby transforming Spain into a country of immigration. The main increase of the immigrant population occurred in the last 5 years, 20\% annually\textsuperscript{17} transforming Spain into one of the main receiving countries of the EU.

\textit{Table 1. Foreign and Moroccan population as \% of the total population}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Total population</th>
<th>Total foreigners</th>
<th>% of total pop.</th>
<th>Total Morocco</th>
<th>% of total pop.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>40,460,055</td>
<td>499,773</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>74,886</td>
<td>0.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>39,669,394</td>
<td>538,984</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>77,189</td>
<td>0.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>39,852,651</td>
<td>719,647</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>140,896</td>
<td>0.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>40,202,160</td>
<td>801,329</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>161,870</td>
<td>0.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>40,499,791</td>
<td>895,720</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>199,782</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>41,116,842</td>
<td>1,109,060</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>234,937</td>
<td>0.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>41,837,894</td>
<td>1,324,001</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>282,432</td>
<td>0.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>42,717,064</td>
<td>1,647,011</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>333,770</td>
<td>0.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\textsuperscript{14} Statistical data on the number of foreigners in Spain are related to foreign residents who are in possession of a temporary or permanent residence permit, registered at the Ministry of Interior.\textsuperscript{16} Except of 2000, when the increase was 19.4\%. All numbers are based on data from \textit{Anuarios Estadistico de Extranjeria} and \textit{Informes Estadisticos}, Secretaria de Estado de Inmigración y emigración, Ministerio de Trabajo y Asuntos Sociales
Moroccans have seen the largest and most sustained increase over the last 25 years (M. Khachani, 2004). The most important incentives (pull factors) are the historical and economic bonds in the Mediterranean, the political evolution of Spain after the authoritarian regime and the poor conditions of the labour market in Morocco (B. López, García, 2004; 213-215). While other European countries received immigrants from Morocco already in the first half of the twentieth century, Spain evolved towards a transit and receiving country since the ‘80s and the first half of the ‘90s.

The Moroccan population has grown from 74,886 in 1995 to some 493,114 people in 2005, thereby representing currently 1.1% of the total population and 18% of the total immigrant population. In terms of net immigration, a general increase can be observed over the whole period from 1996-2005. Until 2000 the increase of Moroccan immigration neatly fits the total increase, but since 2000 there is a sharp increase in the net immigration that is not caused by Moroccan immigration. This is due to the fact that immigration patterns are changing. In the year 2000, some 35% of the immigrants were citizens from other EU countries, 24% from Northern Africa and 21% from Latin America. In 2005 these number have changed considerably, only 21% coming from other EU countries (taken into account the enlargement) and 19% from North African countries, while the large share, 36% comes from Latin America.

Table 2. Immigrant population 2000 and 2005

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>% EU</th>
<th>% North Africa</th>
<th>% Latin America</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Anuarios Estadísticos de Extranjería 2000 (December 31) and Informe Estadístico 31-12-2005, Ministerio de Trabajo y Asuntos Sociales.

When tracing back the development of the main immigrant nationalities, especially Ecuadorian and Rumanian immigrant groups have increased considerable last 5-10 years, thereby reflecting the labour quota policy to manage immigration flows in terms of labour market demands by sector of the economy and nationality (R. Sandell, 2006; 3-5).


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total foreign population</td>
<td>499,773</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>895,720</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>2,738,932</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>4,48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>74,886</td>
<td>15.0</td>
<td>199,782</td>
<td>22.3</td>
<td>493,114</td>
<td>18.0</td>
<td>5,58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ecuador</td>
<td>1,963</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>30,878</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>357,956</td>
<td>13.0</td>
<td>180.90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td>1,769</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>19,792</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>37,454</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>210.62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rumania</td>
<td>1,200</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>16,286</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>42,424</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>253.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>2,251</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>52,951</td>
<td>6.0</td>
<td>105,701</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>137.88</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

It is difficult to be certain about the percentage of foreigners and Moroccans living Spain, because of the difficulty to measure the so-called "illegal" immigrants. A common way to measure "illegal immigration" has been to compare numbers of immigrants registered within the Padrón Municipal at the municipality level (including foreigners with residence permits and undocumented immigrants) with the number of foreigners registered by the Ministry of Interior (with residence permit). This comparison though is not very adequate, because the possibility to register oneself within different municipalities at the same time makes multiple counting possible.

19 It is difficult to be certain about the percentage of foreigners and Moroccans living Spain, because of the difficulty to measure the so-called “illegal” immigrants. A common way to measure “illegal immigration” has been to compare numbers of immigrants registered within the Padrón Municipal at the municipality level (including foreigners with residence permits and undocumented immigrants) with the number of foreigners registered by the Ministry of Interior (with residence permit). This comparison though is not very adequate, because the possibility to register oneself within different municipalities at the same time makes multiple counting possible.

20 Ecuadorians and Colombians did not need a visa to enter Spain until recently, for Colombia since 2001 and Ecuador since June 2003 (S. Alscher, 2005; 7)
In terms of “legal” immigration, there are two different residency regimes: foreigners who are citizens of the European Economic Area, all whom subscribe to the Community Regime and receive a residency card; and those included in the General Regime, who must obtain the corresponding residency authorization, that may be temporary or permanent. Moroccan immigrants belong to the General Regime for the so-called “third country” nationals.

In 2005 the Community Regime covered 28.5% and the General Regime 71.5%. Within this General Regime there are different types of permits: initial, first renovation, second renovation, permanent and other. Temporary residence permits (initial, first and second renovation) are valid for more than 90 days and less than 5 years, granted to people who can support themselves and their family, have a work permit, have been living in Spain for at least five years, or for humanitarian reasons. Another requirement is not having a criminal record. Permanent residence permits are given to those who have lived for at least five consecutive years with a temporary resident permit (R. Zapata-Barrero, 2003c; 26). In table 4 the type of residence for 2005 is presented for Morocco, continents and the total immigrant population. The large numbers of Moroccans that have a permanent residence permit (some 44%) demonstrate the consolidation of the Moroccan immigrant community in Spain.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of residence permit</th>
<th>Inicial</th>
<th>1st renovation</th>
<th>2nd renovation</th>
<th>Permanent</th>
<th>Other</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>MOROCCO</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number</td>
<td>433,483</td>
<td>129,832</td>
<td>55,464</td>
<td>77,030</td>
<td>206,951</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>%</td>
<td>27.42</td>
<td>15.71</td>
<td>11.71</td>
<td>16.27</td>
<td>43.71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EUROPE COMM</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number</td>
<td>15,294</td>
<td>174,907</td>
<td>68,548</td>
<td>106,601</td>
<td>260,571</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>%</td>
<td>45.44</td>
<td>15.39</td>
<td>11.08</td>
<td>17.23</td>
<td>34.24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>REST EUROPE</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number</td>
<td>320,835</td>
<td>177,078</td>
<td>68,548</td>
<td>106,601</td>
<td>260,571</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>%</td>
<td>54.52</td>
<td>15.39</td>
<td>11.08</td>
<td>17.23</td>
<td>34.24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AFRICA</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number</td>
<td>618,843</td>
<td>177,078</td>
<td>68,548</td>
<td>106,601</td>
<td>260,571</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>%</td>
<td>28.61</td>
<td>15.39</td>
<td>11.08</td>
<td>17.23</td>
<td>34.24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LATIN AMERICA</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number</td>
<td>826,695</td>
<td>360,281</td>
<td>104,800</td>
<td>205,994</td>
<td>80,071</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>%</td>
<td>43.58</td>
<td>18.73</td>
<td>18.73</td>
<td>24.92</td>
<td>9.69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NORTH AMERICA</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number</td>
<td>8,447</td>
<td>1,448</td>
<td>1,345</td>
<td>933</td>
<td>4,453</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>%</td>
<td>17.14</td>
<td>15.92</td>
<td>15.92</td>
<td>11.05</td>
<td>32.72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OCEANIA</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number</td>
<td>723</td>
<td>165</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>232</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>%</td>
<td>22.82</td>
<td>7.88</td>
<td>7.88</td>
<td>7.75</td>
<td>32.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>1,958,091</td>
<td>768,768</td>
<td>300,454</td>
<td>414,900</td>
<td>42,129</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>%</td>
<td>39.36</td>
<td>15.34</td>
<td>15.34</td>
<td>21.19</td>
<td>2.15</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4. Type of residence permits: Morocco, Continental and Total


Pie 1. Type of residence permits: Moroccan community

---

Based on the information available in the Statistical yearbooks of Ministerio de Trabajo y Asuntos Sociales.
Foreigners may acquire Spanish citizenship after a certain period of time, depending on their nationality. For Moroccans it takes 8 years to ask for Spanish citizenship after the initial two years’ residence permit (R. Zapata-Barrero, 2004a). In 2003, 6831 Moroccans were granted Spanish citizenship (amounting to 25.7% of the total award), and in 2004 this number was 8036 (amounting to 20.9% of the total awards) (Anuario estadístico de inmigración 2004, Ministerio de Trabajo y Asuntos sociales). Compared to the total Moroccan immigrant population some 2% attains Spanish citizenship yearly.

Next to legal residing residents, many immigrants reside in Spain without a residence permit. The number of applications in the different regularization rounds is an important indicator to measure the number of illegal residents (see table 5). Spain had six major regularization programmes since the first Immigration law in 1985, launched by the government to reduce the number of unauthorized immigrants in the country, correct for shortcomings of previous regularization rounds and control the informal economy (for more information on the regularization rounds see chapter 4). Moroccans have been one of the main groups profiting from these regularizations. In the last regularization round (between February and May 2005) which was mainly focussed on the regularization of illegal workers, some 691,655 people have applied for the regularization of their situation. In total 573,270 were resolved positively, of whom 64,697 were Moroccans. B. López Garcia (2004; 213-215) in this context argues that since the visa requirements starting in 1991, the increase of Moroccans is mainly due to the different legalisation rounds that gave illegal residing Moroccans legal residence permits, thereby explaining the peaks of Moroccan net immigration, just after the regularization programmes (see graph 1).

### Table 5. Extraordinary Regularization rounds 1985 – 2005

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Number of applicants</th>
<th>People regularized (x1000)</th>
<th>Moroccans Regularized</th>
<th>% of total regularized</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1985-1986 Regularization</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>43,800</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1991 Regularization</td>
<td>128,127</td>
<td>110,067</td>
<td>49,089</td>
<td>44,6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996 Regularization</td>
<td>24,637</td>
<td>19,634</td>
<td>6,479</td>
<td>33,0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000 Regularization</td>
<td>247,598</td>
<td>163,913</td>
<td>45,170</td>
<td>27,6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001 Establishment</td>
<td>351,269</td>
<td>223,428</td>
<td>20,230</td>
<td>9,1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005 Regularization</td>
<td>691,655</td>
<td>573,720</td>
<td>64,697</td>
<td>11,3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

According to the current legislation on nationality (articles 17-26 of Spanish Common Law (Código Civil)) most foreigners have to be resident for ten years to be able to request Spanish nationality. However, this is reduced to only two years for those with a preferential nationality and, if they can claim some historical link with Spanish nationality, just one year (!). The seven nationality preferences are: South Americans, Portuguese, Filipinos, Andorrans, Equatoguineans, Gibraltarians, Sephardic Jews.
Graph 1. Moroccan net immigration 1996-2005, % of total net immigration

Source: Elaboration of data from Anuarios Estadístico de Extranjería 1996-2004 (December 31) and Informe Estadístico 31-12-2005, Ministerio de Trabajo y Asuntos Sociales.

2.3 Social-economic characteristics

2.3.1 Sex, age and marital status

The immigrant population consist of 45.8% women. Moroccan immigrants show a different picture with only 34.6% women. Although the majority of Moroccan immigrants consist of men, there has been an increase in women in the last decade, due to both family reunification and larger shares of female emigration from Morocco (G. Aubarell & X. Aragall, 2004; 11). Some scholars argue that the increase of women is not so much a result of the feminization of Moroccan immigration, but rather of the decrease of Moroccan men immigrating to Spain (A. Ramírez, 2004; 223).

On average immigrants are often younger than the national population, because most of them fall within the economic active age cohort of 16-64 years (except of the group retirees). The Moroccan immigrant population consists for more than third part is of people between 16 and 64 years old, while almost the rest is younger than 16 years old. The low number of Moroccan elderly is striking, because Moroccan immigration is not a new phenomenon. The average age of immigrants is 34 years (for both men and women), while Moroccan immigrants are a bit younger with 29 and 26 years for men and women respectively. As the marital status is concerned, 49.4% of the Moroccan women is single and 43.7% are married. For the men the picture is slightly different: 59.4% of the men is single and 39% are married. The rest is either separated/ divorced or widow (B. López Garcia & M. Berriane, 2004; 217). The natural increase of the Moroccan population is much higher than that of the Spanish population. As a consequence the birth rate in 2002 was for 12.6%

---

23 Informes Estadísticos de Extranjería 31-12-2005, Ministerio de Trabajo y Asuntos Sociales.
produced by the immigrant population (while immigrants only made up 3.2% of the total population). The increase of the total population between 2001 and 2002 has for 28.7% been due to the increase in foreign residence. As far as the Moroccan immigrant community is concerned, the natural increase in 2002 (of children with either a Moroccan father or mother) was 8,850, representing 2.4% of the total natural increase (being 374,648) (Anuario Estadístico de Extranjería 2004, Ministerio de Trabajo y Asuntos Sociales).

2.3.2 Education levels and integration in the labour market

In terms of the levels of education, there is no much difference between the immigrant and total population. For Moroccans though the picture is a bit different from the total immigrant population (see graph 2). The number of alphabetic Moroccan workers (18.5%) is considerable higher than in the total immigrant population (12.9%) and there are also more Moroccan immigrant workers that have enjoyed only primary education (22.7% compared to 14.9%). What is most striking though is the relative high number of immigrant workers with secondary education, representing some 58% of the total Moroccan immigrant workers.

Graph 2. Level of education of total immigrant and Moroccan immigrant population with a registered labour contract.


A similar pattern is found when looking at the number of Moroccan university students in the academic year 2002-2003. The 2725 Moroccan students registered represent 16% of the total foreign student population. Postgraduate students only represent 4% (437), a finding that is supported by the lower number of Moroccan immigrant workers with a post-secondary study (see graph 2). In general though the levels of education do not seem to fit quite well the positions of Moroccan immigrants on the Spanish labour market (see pie 2).

25 The data refer to those contracts registered by the Office of Employment throughout the year 2004 and is limited to foreign workers.
Pie 2. Moroccan workers with a registered contract, by sector of employment


At 12-07-2005 there are 238,796 Moroccan immigrant workers registered within the social security system, of whom 17.4% women. Although there are a small proportion of self-employed Moroccan immigrants (5.7%) mainly in the commercial or hotel business, most Moroccan workers are employed in the service, agricultural and construction sectors.

Graph 3. Moroccan workers with registered contract, by employment sector and sex


There are differences between sectors of the labour market between men and women. The majority of the women work in domestic services, while the men are divided among the sectors of agriculture, construction and services. Although Moroccan women only represent 12% of the total contracts registered, they have twice as much indefinite contracts (8.8%) as men (4.4%) relatively (see graph 4).²⁷

²⁷ Anuario Estadístico de Extranjería 2004, Ministerio de Trabajo y Asuntos Sociales
The complete integration of these workers into the labour market is a complex process, as is shown by the high level of unemployment, 22,404 persons were registered at 30-06-2005 at the National Employment Institute, representing 9.3% of the Moroccan immigrant population registered. Moroccan job seekers moreover represent almost one fourth of the total foreign job seeking population (33,536 persons), thereby hinting at the problems of integration in the Spanish society (Boletín Estadístico de Extranjería e Inmigración, 2005). On the other hand some segments of the labour market operate without any regulation and imply a high proportion of foreigners. This is the case with the domestic service, home care not covered by public services and to a lesser extent agriculture. The presence of undocumented foreigners has become a structural phenomenon in these sectors of the economy (R. Zapata-Barrero, 2003c; 5).

2.4 Remittances

Morocco is one of the world’s most dependent countries on remittances sent by emigrants, representing 9.6% of GDP in 2001 (M. Khachani, 2003; 14). Since the early 1970s, remittances have become increasingly important for the Moroccan Balance of Payment, next to tourism being the major source of income (N. Nyberg Sorensen, 2004; 5). Remittances from Spain have increased rapidly the last decade. In 2003 Moroccan immigrants residing sent remittances totalling 3724,10 million of Dirham (that is almost 350 million euros). As can be seen in graph 13 the evolution of workers’ remittances is characterized by a sudden surge in 2001. While the remittances between 1999 and 2001 almost doubled, there are no figures that suggest that the number of immigrants has doubled in this period (I. Moré, 2005; 17). Currently Spain is the third-largest provider of remittances, after France and Italy. In 2005 remittances from Spain counted for 12% of the total remittances received by Morocco.

---

28 According to the Handbook of Statistics of UNCTAD, Morocco is the fourth among developing countries receiving remittances in the world, behind India, Mexico and the Philippines
Transfers are made partly through the banking system, but also through postal and other money-transfer services. A significant share of transfer is made in cash, especially when Moroccans travel to their home country (J. Bougha-Hagbe, 2004; 10). The flows are therefore traditionally high during the holiday period of July and August and during peaks of feast and religious festivals (N. Nyberg Sorensen, 2004; 6). A recent article in L’Economiste (M. Kably, 2006) reports Spain’s growing importance as a source of remittances, 35% sent to the home country in informal ways.

The remittances sent by immigrants are estimated to keep some 1,2 million Moroccans out of poverty. The literature does not quite agree on the development effects of remittances, due to the ambiguous effect for agriculture and the investments made in real estate, which is often considered to have a negligible effect on the local economy. M.
Khachani (2003) on the contrary argues that investments in housing are far from negligible, because of the positive effects on the quality of living. 

3. Perception of Moroccan immigrants

3.1 Public opinion on Immigration

3.1.1 Development of immigration as country problem in relation to key events

Since 1991, several CIS (Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas) studies have focused on Spanish attitudes towards the immigrant population. Since February 2000, questions related to migration issues are included in the survey on a monthly basis, thereby reflecting the relatively recent entry of immigration on the Spanish political agenda (R. Zapata-Barrero, 2003c; 10). Immigration becomes one of the permanent categories from September 2000 onwards. In the graph below the ranking of “immigration” and the total number of frequent given answers defined in advance can be found between brackets on the X-axe.

Graph 7. Trends in Spanish concerns about immigration. Answers to the question: According to you what are the three most important problems facing our country today? And what are the three most important problems that affect you personally?

Immigration is perceived to be most of all a problem of the Spanish state, rather than affecting individuals personally, but the patterns of both responses over time are quite similar. Focussing on immigration as a country problem there are several remarks to make. First of all, during the whole period immigration is perceived as one of the most important

29 For more detailed information on remittances see M. Khachani, 2003; 21-22 and G. Aubarell and X. Aragall, 2004; 26.

30 The monthly held “barometers” by the CIS measure public opinion in Spain in relation to the political and economic situation of the country. For more detailed information see http://www.cis.es

31 Ranking is based on the predetermined answer categories provided by the CIS. In some cases immigration shared its relative place with other answer categories.
country problems, next to unemployment, civic insecurity, terrorism, dwelling, economic and political problems. Immigration is one of the 9 most important problems mentioned, while on average it takes the 4th position. Second, what is striking is that since April 2005 immigration has not left the top 3 of important problems, reflecting a growing and consolidated concern about immigration from 2004 onwards. Since October 2005, immigration is even ranked in the 2nd position after unemployment, but before terrorism. Third, there can be observed several peaks in the graph, where concerns over immigration are high. There are several possible reasons for these peaks, which will be shortly addressed.

The first peak in **February 2001** can be due to several reasons. First, there were important changes in legislation, with a new immigration law coming into force in January 2001 (*Ley de extranjeria 8/2000*). The law was mainly aimed at fighting illegal immigration, but also stripped immigrant workers of the rights of association, protest and strike. The law was accompanied by a Royal Decree establishing the requirements for the regularization of foreigners able to demonstrate they were residing in Spain before 1 January 2001. Second, as a consequence of this legislative change there were several hunger strikes in Barcelona and sit-ins by immigrants in various regions of the country in order to obtain the regularization of their situation, before the change in the law. A third reason can be a bus accident in Lorca, which killed 12 undocumented immigrants and highlighted the precarious and illegal employment situation of many immigrants without residence and work permits. Finally there was an alarmist tone adopted by public figures on issues of immigration, which might have raised concerns (R. Zapata-Barrero, 2004b; 109-111 and R. Zapata-Barrero, 2003c; 10,11).

The second peak takes place in **June 2002**, in a period of time were concerns about immigration are high from May – September 2002 (above 20%). In this period of time the control of (illegal) immigration was a hot topic on the political agenda in Spain as well as in the rest of Europe. First of all illegal immigration was one of the priorities of the Aznar government, which became manifest in the more restrictive 8/2000 law, but also in the signing of new bilateral agreements with Colombia, the Dominican Republic and Romania to return illegal immigrants. *SOS Racismo* reports that between May and June there has been a massive expulsion of Nigerian immigrants as a consequence of such a bilateral agreement (SOS Racismo, 2002; 116). A key event in the fight against illegal immigration was the Seville Summit of the EU under Spanish Presidency at 21 and 22 June 2002. This can also be understood as an explanation for the growing public consent about immigration within Spanish society, in order to push the government to make it a topic on the European agenda. In this period, immigration also became a contested topic on the political agenda in Catalonia, where immigrants were increasingly interpreted as a threat to the Catalan society and identity. First, the growing number of Moroccan immigrants settling in Catalonia was being interpreted as a policy incentive of the national government to weaken autonomy of the Catalan community. Second there were conflicts related to the Islamic community, which mainly became manifest in the racist protests against the building of mosques and conflicts over imams. This led the President of the *Generalitat* to claim the right to construct a Catalan immigration policy (I. Anguera, 2002; M. Pérez, 2002).

After a period of relative low concerns, since September 2004 there can be observed a general increase. The third peak is in **April 2005**, reflecting the two-month regularization process adopted by the Spanish Government (this time called a “Normalization process”) to end illegal employment of migrants and control the black market. Many protests and hunger strikes took place in Barcelona by immigrants that could not fulfil the conditions of the regularization rounds and claimed to be driven into the hands of exploiting employers (*La...* 32 Note also the relatively low numbers (below 10%) in November/ December 2001, March/ April 2003 and March 2004 that are mainly a result of concerns about ETA terrorism (the last mainly as a consequence of the terrorist attacks in Madrid).
Another item in the news concerned the issue of growing numbers of undocumented Sub-Saharan Africans arriving at the Canary Islands and Ceuta and Melilla. As the reception centres could not take care of all the arriving immigrants, flights had to be arranged to transport them to other parts of Spain (Morcillo, 2005; 19).

The escalation of the situation in Ceuta and Melilla (see also chapter 1) coincides with the last three months of 2005, where the highest peak is observed in **November 2005** (when immigration accounts for 40% of the responses). As a consequence of the drama at the border, the issue of illegal immigration again becomes a major topic on the social and political agenda in Spain. It is also a priority issue discussed at the Euro Mediterranean Partnership Conference in Barcelona, taking place 25 and 26 November 2005 and at the European Council Summit in Brussels 15 and 16 December 2005, resulting (among others) in the EU financing of the amplification of the *Sistema de Vigilancia Exterior (SIVE)* to cover the whole Mediterranean region, including the Canary Islands (A. Missé, 2005; 2). Another reason for this last peak are the riots caused by immigrant populations in big cities in France, which found a great deal of attention in the Spanish press as well (see also M. Méndez Lago, 2006; 1-2).

### 3.1.2 The perception of the number of immigrants

In November 2005 a question about the number of immigrants appears in the CIS barometer. In the graph below the results demonstrate that there is an increasing number of people thinking there are many immigrants, while the percentage of people thinking there are only a few is decreasing (see graph 8). What is remarking is the strong correlation with levels of education. People with low levels of education are more likely to think there are many immigrants living in Spain (See table 6). The social class variable gives a similar picture. Ideology also has a clear influence on the perception of the number of immigrants. The left wing oriented population is less concerned over the number of immigrants than the right wing oriented population, but both groups score rather high on the answer category of “many”.

*Graph 8*. Spanish concerns about immigration numbers. Answers to the question: According to you what are the three most important problems facing our country today? And what are the three most important problems that affect you personally?
This general concern over the number of immigrants living in the country is confirmed by another question in the CIS Barometer of November 2005: *Of every 100 persons, how many do you think have been born outside the country?* The average of 20.44 reflects at least the double of the “real” number of immigrants in 2005 (the highest number being 8.5%, based on the number of foreigners registered at the municipality level).

Table 6. Perception of the number of immigrants by level of education, ideology and social class

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Level of education</th>
<th>Many</th>
<th>A lot, but not too many</th>
<th>Few</th>
<th>N.S.</th>
<th>N.C.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Without studies</td>
<td>73.8</td>
<td>15.8</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Primary school</td>
<td>67.9</td>
<td>27.7</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>0.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secondary school</td>
<td>54.6</td>
<td>37.3</td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>0.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Professional education</td>
<td>57.9</td>
<td>37.6</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>University graduate</td>
<td>39.2</td>
<td>46.2</td>
<td>10.1</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>University postgraduate</td>
<td>32.9</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>7.6</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No answer</td>
<td>66.7</td>
<td>33.3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>59.6</td>
<td>33.3</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>0.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ideology</th>
<th>Many</th>
<th>A lot, but not too many</th>
<th>Few</th>
<th>N.S.</th>
<th>N.C.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1-2</td>
<td>43.2</td>
<td>42.5</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>2.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3-4</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>41.4</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5-6</td>
<td>58.2</td>
<td>35.5</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>0.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7-8</td>
<td>71.5</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>1.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9-10</td>
<td>83.8</td>
<td>13.5</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N.S.</td>
<td>66.1</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>6.7</td>
<td>0.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N.C.</td>
<td>68.6</td>
<td>25.1</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>0.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>59.6</td>
<td>33.3</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>0.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Social class</th>
<th>Many</th>
<th>A lot, but not too many</th>
<th>Few</th>
<th>N.S.</th>
<th>N.C.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Clase alta/ media-alta</td>
<td>42.7</td>
<td>44.4</td>
<td>7.3</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>1.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nuevas clases medias</td>
<td>55.6</td>
<td>37.8</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>0.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Viejas clases medias</td>
<td>67.2</td>
<td>27.3</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>0.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Obreros cualificados</td>
<td>65.5</td>
<td>28.4</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>0.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Obreros no cualificados</td>
<td>67.6</td>
<td>27.8</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>0.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>60.1</td>
<td>32.9</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>0.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Barómetro del Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas (CIS), November 2005.

3.1.3. Public opinion on Moroccan immigrants

In public opinion, immigration is highly linked to the illegal entry of immigrants and the threat for security. For example, a question related to this securitization of immigration can be found in the Barometer of May 2003: *Do you agree strongly, agree somehow, agree a little or disagree with the statement that today there exists a relation between civic insecurity and immigration?* Only 12.5% of the people does not agree, while respectively, 22.8%, 44.2% and 13.9% agree a little, somehow or even strongly with the statement.

---

33 Instituto National de Estadistica, Padrón municipal 1-1-2005
When talking about immigrants Morocco best represent the “cultural” other, as can be seen in February 2000 and June 2002: *When we talk about foreign immigrants that live in Spain, who do think of immediately?* While in 2000 56.8% of the respondents name Moroccans/ North Africans, in 2002 78.4% Moroccans or “Magrebi’s”. The second and third most often named groups are Africans in general and Latin Americans.

A question that shows a traditional hostility towards North Africans appears in the CIS Barometer in February 2000 and 2001. The category “North Africans (Moroccans etc.)” has the lowest scores. In the same Barometers appear questions about the preoccupation of having children married to an immigrant and having neighbours or colleges being immigrants from different origins. Although no extreme results are found here, “Morocco and other North African countries” always have the most negative scores compared to other immigrant groups. It should be noted that these questions are considerably biased towards ethnic and racist answers. Giving answers thereby becomes a discursive practice, involving bias towards political correctness (E. Terrén, 2004: 439-441).

A very clear example of such a biased question that is asked in order to justify a reactive government policy appears in February 2000 is: *Do you think that the measures taken by the government in the matter of immigration should be the same for all immigrants or should be different for different nationalities?* Followed by the question for (only) those who think that the measures should be different: *To the following groups of immigrants, to which one do you give preference to facilitate permanent residence?* It is not surprising that after the defeat of the right wing government by the Socialist party in 2004, such questions disappeared from the CIS questionnaires.

While concerns over immigration seem to be rather high in the CIS data, more indirect measures on perceptions of immigrants and immigration policy in for example the barometer of November 2005 do not give such results (in the sense of a negative attitude towards immigrants). Although people seem to favour limited immigration flows and link immigration to insecurity, they don’t seem to be racist or xenophobic towards immigrant living in their country (granted them rights and opportunities) (See also M. Méndez Lago, 2006). It is doubtful however if this argument holds when the perception of Moroccan immigrants is concerned. In the next paragraph the social construction of traditional hostility towards Moroccans is further explored.

3.2 Political discourse: maurophobia and Spanish identity-building process

The main focuses of the political discourse on immigration are legal aspects (legislation, rights and regularizations) and security (borders, expulsions and irregularity) (R. Zapata-Barrero, 2005; 87). Immigration is basically conceived as a problem of the management of “illegal” immigration. Only more recently there is a trend towards political attention on the integration of immigrants. In this context there can be witnessed a considerable change in political discourse on immigration after the socialists won the elections in 2004. On the one hand, the change in government has opened possibilities to change restrictive migration policy. On the other hand, the terrorist attacks of 11

---

34 The exact question is: *A continuación, voy a leerle una lista de personas de varios países o regiones del mundo. Dígame, por favor, en una escala del 0 al 10, la simpatía que Ud. tiene por cada uno de ellos, teniendo en cuenta que el 0 significa “ninguna simpatía” y el 10 “mucha simpatía”. While North Africans (marroquíes, etc.) score a median of 6.01 and 5.89 in 2000 and 2001 respectively, Latin Americans and Europeans for example score above 7 in both years.

35 The exact questions are: *¿Hasta qué punto le preocuparía que un hijo o una hija suya se casara con un ciudadano de cada uno de estos países? ¿Y tener como vecinos a una familia de ciudadanos de cada uno de estos países? ¿Y como compañeros de trabajo?* While the Aznar government (PP) (from 1996-2004) focussed mainly on security (and the control of illegal immigration), the socialist (PSOE) government of Zapatero (since 2004-2008) is also concerned about the social integration, regularization and normalization of immigrants.
March 2004 have stimulated racist and xenophobic sentiments (see also SOS Racismo, 2006), mainly directed against Muslim immigrants.

Of all immigrant groups, the Moroccan immigrant best represents “the cultural other”, because neither language nor religion is shared with Spaniards. Muslim presence and practices moreover have constantly been associated with negative news in the media, thereby leading to “Maurophobia”. Islam has historically been excluded from the formation of the Spanish (Christian) identity (R. Zapata-Barrero, 2006). This is why there are some discourses that tend to view Moroccan immigration as a threat to the Spanish identity, Moroccan as potential “cultural invaders,” or even as a new Arab invasion (J. de Lucas, 2002; 23-48), or the re-Islamization of Spain (G. Martín Muñoz, 1996; 9-16). Immigration has been incorporated into the political discourse at the expense of one specific ethnic group: Moroccans.

This aspect of Spanish identity-building is also nourished by media, which constantly associate the most negative news with Muslim presence and practices. The presentation of a “process of Islamization” of Spain is also driven by the Spanish authorities that draw on these historical stereotypes to restrict the public space available to the Muslim community. In this situation, the construction of Muslim facilities acquires vital importance, and so too is the Muslim presence in schools and the redesigning of cemeteries.

This fact is the premise of an analysis linking the Muslim community and the Spanish tradition. The analysis is typically approached from two different perspectives. One perspective argues that Islam belongs to the Spanish cultural tradition and identity. The other argues that Islam is alien to the Spanish cultural tradition and identity, which is based on the Greco-Roman and Judeo-Christian heritage. Consequently each perspective employs a different form of political discourse.

The first approach defends the idea that there is one tradition rather than two. It demonstrates that Spain is the only Western European context in which the Islamic tradition developed a cultural society and a political system that lasted centuries. Spain is the only country in Western Europe, which had been Islamized for so long (we know that the Balkans and Sicily were also Islamized). Thus, this perspective gives rise to a political discourse emphasizing what is held in common.

The second perspective portrays two separate traditions that have been historically at odds. It follows a political discourse that stresses what is different between and separates the Muslim and Spanish traditions. It has also constructed a hostile tradition by drawing a negative picture of the Moroccan inspired by “the Moor” (“el moro”) figure. The main line of this argument is that current Spanish tradition is the result of the Christian victory over Islam. Muslim people are by nature unable to be integrated into a society and a public sphere that is replete with Catholic customs. The Spanish public sphere is structurally Catholic.

This political discourse generates divergence and instability in society. Politicians not only avoid talking about immigration, but when they do so, their discursive behaviour is alarmist and even contains populist components linking the Muslim community to insecurity and social instability. Moroccan immigrants threat our culture and democracy (therefore in
order to integrate we have to change their culture). The image of the Moroccan is based on inferiority: physically, economically and culturally; Migration is criminalized in the press by often naming nationality in crime and linking Moroccan to terrorism.37 Almost all press is about the attempts of Moroccan immigrants to come to Spain and make living.

The cultural and religious criteria are not new, and have already been used for the formal selection of immigrants. It is even said that it is not immigrant selection that is taking place, but really an “ethnic filter” and even a “Darwinist politics of immigration” (B. López García, 2003). In general terms, we would say that the labour market attracts immigrants, but politics selects them using colonial and national identity criteria. In the management of its new multicultural society, Spain is currently at the beginning of some sort of Hispanidad revival.

Hispanidad is a political term that was created precisely to comprise the whole Spanish area of influence, designating a linguistic (Spanish) and religious (Catholic) community and creating a sense of belonging, with the exclusion of non-Spanish speakers, atheists, Masons, Jews, and Muslims. The Franco regime (1940-1975) reconstructed this term as a symbol of homogeneity and unity, as a cohesive society with the slogan Una, Grande y Libre (One, Great and Free) (L. González Antón, 1997; 613). Hispanidad was a political construction separating people in a Manichaean fashion (J. Vila Selma, 1966; 551). Those following the regime were good citizens; those with some doubts about it (i.e., republicans) were bad citizens. This construction of Hispanidad aimed at creating the notion of the Hispanic race in order to obtain a sentiment of loyalty and patriotism. Patriotism, race and religion were an explosive mixture that dominated the conservative political discourse (and academic arena) during the first half of the 20th century (M. García Morente, 1938), and legitimatized the Franco regime (M. Carbayo Abengózar, 1998).

This binary logic still exists today, although with a rather different dimension. The bad citizens are those who do not speak Spanish and hold beliefs other than Catholic: Moroccans are the first candidates and are constantly used in a political discourse that reminds us of this imagery of Hispanidad. Society’s perception of immigration is usually that of Muslims as a religious minority. At the same time, there are conservative discourses on European identity and civilization that advocate Christian tradition and politically construct Islam as anti-European and anti-Christian.

4. Spanish Immigration policy: Bilateral relations Spain - Morocco

The relations between Spain and Morocco are both historically and geographically determined. Spain granted independence to the northern strip of Morocco in April 1956, just after France. From the Spanish point of view, diplomatic relations are quite contradictory because on the one hand Morocco is an important trade partner, while on the other hand it is perceived as the enemy of national security, because of the Mediterranean border (D. Ben Ali, 2002; 256-258). Historically, the main issues of conflict in the bilateral relations between the two countries are fishing, Moroccan claims on the Spanish enclaves of Ceuta and Melilla, the conflict in the Western Sahara and more recently (mainly after the Spanish accession to Schengen) the issue of immigration.

37 See also F. Bravo López (2004; 433 - 437) who addresses how this cultural discourse of Muslim immigrants justifying racism and social exclusion can be understood in terms of Huntington’s thesis of a clash of civilisations.
In the context of immigration, the responsibility of irregular immigration is a common dispute between both countries. While Spain accuses Morocco of not taking responsibility for this problem and protecting its borders, according to Morocco it is a problem of the stringent Spanish labour quota policy (that cannot provide the legal entrance of the demand on the labour market) and a lack of development assistance (SOS Racismo 2002; 253-255). The refusal of Morocco to take back undocumented nationals or other Africans has lead to increasing pressure from the EU and Spain in particular. The new Immigration law (8/2000) in this context has paved the way to expulse undocumented immigrants, by signing Readmission Agreements with sending countries (N. Vives I Ferrer, 2001; 47-52). This policy has been highly relevant for Morocco, being one of the countries that signed such an agreement with Spain, which was renovated in 2005 under pressure of the invasion of immigrants in Ceuta and Melilla. Other bilateral agreements signed between both countries are the Agreement of Residence and Work permits of Moroccans and Spanish in Morocco (1996), the Agreement on Moroccan temporal workers (1999) and the Agreement of the establishment of labour quota (2001). The yearly establishment of the number of Moroccan immigrants needed within the Spanish labour market in this context is another point of discussion between Morocco and Spain.

Next to issues over immigration, diplomatic relations between Spanish and Moroccan governments are also affected by demands of Morocco for the return of the Spanish enclaves of Ceuta and Melilla, trade conflicts in the form of export of tomatoes and strawberries to the EU, the dwindling fish stocks and the unresolved question of the Western Sahara (International Organization for Migration, 2002; 64-65). A recent dispute between the two countries concerned the sovereign status of Isla Perejil in 2002, a small island in the Mediterranean Sea, 2000m off the coast of Morocco, 5 km from Ceuta. The island has been under Spanish control since 1668, but is claimed by Morocco. It was occupied in July 2002 by Moroccan police troops, who were evicted without bloodshed by Spanish naval forces, who soon after withdrew from the island. Moroccan authorities expressed their concern that smugglers and terrorists were using the island (T. Lehtinen, 2005; 10).

5. Conclusions: theoretical considerations

The main purpose of this report has been to overview the main trends of Moroccan immigration flows and settlement in Spain and to relate this to Spanish perceptions of immigration and immigration policies. One of the first concluding arguments is that these trends and relations cannot be analysed in isolation, but are interdependent. There are many possible causal correlations to be made, but none of them can be considered scientifically definitive in time and space. Nevertheless, this report puts forward a number of theoretical considerations that are important for the understanding of the relation between immigration policies and the flows and settlement of Moroccan immigrants in Spain.

Since the Spanish entry into the European Community in 1985, immigration policy has been very restrictive. While first the European Union pressed Spain to control its borders, nowadays it is Spain that increasingly presses the European Union to consider Border Control as a European issue and not a Spanish one. We have to consider immigrants crossing the sea to come to Europe rather than to Spain. As a consequence of these restrictive policies, legal immigration from Morocco has become more and more difficult and illegal immigration of Moroccans increased, creating not only real problems at the border, but also influenced public opinion on immigration. Most Spanish people in this context have the picture of the “patera” when thinking about immigrants and link illegal immigration to crime. Sentiments of xenophobia and maurophobia within the Spanish society therefore do not seem to provide incentives for Moroccan immigration. Of most relevance is also the fact that contrary to public opinion, the great majority of immigrant entry occurs across the northern land border rather than the southern sea border.

Nevertheless these restrictive attitudes and policies, immigration flows from Morocco continue to be important. The Morocco population still represents 18% of the total foreign population in Spain, followed by Ecuador with 13% in 2005. It should be noted that in spite of having increased considerably from 1995-2005, the % of variation in 10 years has been one of the lowest (5,6%) compared with Ecuador (180,9%), Rumania (158%) and Colombia (28,2%) (see table 3). In 2005, 43,7% of the morocco population hold a permanent residence permit.

38 For a detailed description of these agreements see for example www.intermigra.info
(according to table 4), thereby showing the consolidation of the Moroccan community in Spain. This settlement has resulted in increasing religious and cultural demands from the Moroccan community. We can only speculate about the relations between these Spanish immigration policies and flows and settlements.

Starting with the effects of Spanish immigration policy on immigration flows from Morocco, it is quite straightforward that restrictive immigration policy have resulted in illegal flows of immigration. While in Spain the labour market defines the amount of legal immigrants allowed to enter the country, politics select them on colonial and national identity criteria. Next to the inadequate mechanisms to provide for regular immigration opportunities, irregular immigration is also reproduced by illegal contracting of irregular immigrants. Another effect might be found in of policies of regularization, resulting in incentives for illegal immigration. In this context it is not to be expected that extra border control will stop immigration from Morocco to Spain. Next to providing inadequate policies of immigration, the labour quota policy has also resulted in a specific social profile of Moroccan immigrants residing and working legally in Spain,. The characteristics of moroccan immigrant are: very young (average 29 and 26 years of men and women), mainly men (represents 65,4% of the total Moroccan population), with a secondary study (represents 58% of the total of the Moroccan immigrant workers) working in agriculture (38%), services (29%), construction (28%) and industry (5%). These figures show a gap between Moroccan immigrants’ education and sector of employment (compare graph 2 and pie 2). Policies of family reunification have also increased the share of women within the Moroccan immigrant population.

While the legal framework of immigration is important for understanding the flows and characteristics of immigrants from Morocco, the settlement of Moroccan immigrants have influenced the development of integration policies. The social integration of Moroccan immigrants entered the political and social agenda in 2000 with the El Ejido conflict, focussing on the lack of social integration of illegal workers. The increasing Moroccan community in Spain has resulted in religious and cultural demands, thereby presssing the Spanish government to develop integration policy as well. It should be noted though that in political discourse there is a strong relationship between the Spanish identity-building process based on maurophobia and the immigration policy that tends to follow the tradition of Hispanidad, favouring a religion (Catholic) and a language (Spanish). The terrorist attacks in Madrid 2004 have increased this reactive discourse and resulted in the wish to control the Muslim community and to avoid the presence of extreme imams, as mosques are feared to be centres of terrorism. In this context there is a big gap between theory and facts when considering religious infrastructure. In spite of having one of the most liberal laws for managing religious pluralism (Law 26/1992), Spain has many political and social difficulties for recognising cultural and religious Islamic demands.

References

Books and articles


SOS Racismo (2001-2004), *Informe Annual sobre el Racismo en el Estado español* Barcelona: Icaria


### Institutional documents


*Boletín Estadístico de Extranjería e Inmigración*, No. 6, Julio 2005, Observatorio permanente de Inmigración, Ministerio de Trabajo y Asuntos Sociales, Secretaría de Estado de Inmigración y Emigración (http://extranjeros.mtas.es/)


European Council on Refugees and Exiles (2005) “Melilla tragedy underlines need for Respect for fundamental rights within comprehensive approach to asylum”, Justice and Home Affairs Council (12-13 October)

Frattini, F. (2005) “Recent developments of immigration and integration in the EU and on recent events in the Spanish enclave in Morocco”, Speech (05/667) at Konrad Adenauer Foundation, Brussels (3 November)


*Informe Estadístico de Extranjería* 31-12-2005, Ministerio de Trabajo y Asuntos Sociales, Secretaría de Estado de Inmigración y Emigración (http://extranjeros.mtas.es/)

Instituto National de Estadística, Padrón Municipal (www.ine.es)


Office des Changes, Foreign exchange statistics (http://www.oc.gov.ma/)
Presidencia del Gobierno, (2005a) “Interior ha reforzado con 134 guardias civiles la frontera de Melilla y Camacho anuncia en el Congreso un refuerzo de los medios técnicos”, Notas de prensa de Presidencia del Gobierno, 28 September

Presidencia del Gobierno, (2005b) “El nuevo vallado reducirá las posibilidades de entrar en Ceuta y Melilla y no causará heridas”, Notas de prensa de Presidencia del Gobierno, 5 October


Newspaper articles


Aymía, O. (2003) “Denunciada una escuela de Tarragona por no aceptar hijos de extranjeros”, La Vanguardia, 1 March


Bastante, J. (2004a) “Los musulmanes consideran que el plan de Alonso es propio de “un Estado policíaco”. Piden que se financie la formación de imanes para evitar su radicalización”, ABC, 7 May: 15


Pérez, M. (2002) “La alcaldesa de Premià pide ayuda a los gobiernos ante los brotes de racismo por la futura mezquita Jordi Pujol reclama más competencias para hacer una política de inmigración diferenciada”, El País, 21 May


Ramos Rioja, I. (2004b) “Una ley demasiado perfecta, El acuerdo firmado por el Gobierno y la Comisión Islámica es el más avanzado de Europa, pero no se ha aplicado”, La Vanguardia, 18 April: 34


(2001) “Presentan 5.500 firmas en contra de una mezquita en Premià de Mar”, *ABC, local Catalunya*, 27 November

(2005) “Ceuta-Melilla (Documentación) (actualización) Once avalanchas desde agosto con 11 inmigrantes muertos”, *EFE*, October 6

(2005) “España es el segundo país del mundo, tras Estados Unidos, que acoge más inmigrantes”, *La Vanguardia*, October 26